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Abstract: This paper seeks to identify parameter changes which are robust in the sense that they benefit
women relative to men in a wide range of household models. The models considered are unitary, Nash-
bargaining and non-cooperative with and without cash transfers. Reductions in the relative price of ‘female’
consumer goods prices are robust; increases in relative wages are highly non-robust. Increases in the
relative returns to domestic activities and transfers of financial, physical, and human assets to women are
weakly robust in that they are unlikely to hurt women and benefit them in some cases though they make
no difference in others.1
1 Introduction
Work which uses the household as the fundamental unit of analysis is often accused of implicit
gender bias. However, there are at least three competing models - unitary, bargaining and non-
cooperative - consistent with intra-household inequality. Results on the policy and behavioural
implications of different models are to be found in Sen (1988), Apps and Rees (1988), Ulph
(1988), Alderman et al. (1994), Haddad and Kanbur (1992), Lindberg and Pollak (1993),
Appleton and Collier (1995), Darity (1995), Doss (1996), Mackinnon (1996) McElroy (1997),
Carter and Katz (1997), Alderman et al. (1997) and Appleton et al. (1997). However, the
multiplicity of models tends to undermine the foundations of gender-sensitive economic policy;
the literature cited above presents some very interesting specific cases where different models
generate different policy conclusions, but there has not been a systematic treatment of the welfare
implications of policies in all three kinds of model.
While some non-economists have used the multiplicity of models as a reason for replacing formal
analysis by participation (Kabeer 1994), economists can respond to the multiplicity in two ways
without abandoning formal policy analysis. The first approach, which motivates many of the
papers cited above, is to identify observable differences between the models and test them.
However, while empirical work has revealed a great deal about the household over the last fifteen
years, it has not so far reduced the multiplicity of models, for two main reasons: the results are
often not conclusive for a variety of econometric reasons surveyed in Behrman and Deolalikar
(1988): and there is no reason to expect all households to be the same, especially since there is
empirical evidence against the universal applicability of income-pooling and Pareto-efficiency.
Indeed, some researchers who test for diversity find evidence of it. Dercon and Krishnan (1997)
find interesting differences in the extent of risk-sharing across different parts of Ethiopia and
attribute this to different marital institutions. The analogies of Keynesian-monetarist controversies
and Cournot-Bertrand models of oligopoly show that even intense and prolonged research does
not always achieve the elimination of plausible competing models.
This paper adopts a second, complementary approach, which examines the theoretical predictions
of the models about the effects of exogenous parameter changes on the welfare of men and
women within the household. In particular, I ask: if a policymaker believes that women are
suffering relative disadvantage, but is unsure about the nature of the households in the population,
can s/he identify policies which are robust in the sense that they will improve the relative status
of women in all models ? Because welfare is not directly observable, this is a different theoretical
problem from the derivation of testable implications of the different models (surveyed in Doss
(1996)). Welfare, throughout this paper, is evaluated by a self-interested utility or subutility
function in which an individuals' own consumption and time use are arguments. 
This choice of utility function is important for two reasons. First, the inclusion of different forms
of time use contrasts with the income-based approach which has been widely stressed in the
empirical literature and which has been defended by Kanbur et al. (1994) as a basis for theoretical
policy analysis, but corresponds to the practice in the literature on optimal taxation. It is important
to include time use because there is evidence in some countries that women suffer relative
disadvantage in time use rather than in consumption. One important consequence is that in some
models a rise in relative wages for disagreeable jobs for women can reduce their welfare even
though it increases their incomes. Secondly, the restriction of the welfare function to self-interest,2
even where behaviour is partially altruistic, is designed to address the argument of Sen (1987) and
Nussbaum (1995) that a utilitarian approach which incorporates altruism discriminates against
women if they are conditioned to behave in a more self-sacrificing way than men. 
I consider four alternative models of a two-person household: a unitary model, a Nash-bargaining
model, and a non-cooperative model with two regimes, with and without cash transfers from
husband to wife. Duality is used to simplify the analysis of unitary and bargaining models; this is
not possible with non-cooperative models, where the household does not have a single maximand
and it is necessary to examine consumption and time use separately. I examine four compensated
parameter shifts: reductions in the relative prices of 'female' consumer goods: increases in relative
female wages: increases in the returns to domestic output relative to cash-crops: and transfers of
financial, physical and human assets from men to women. Compensated shifts are analysed in
order to isolate the effects of parameter changes on relative welfare of the sexes; no claim is made
about the effects of non-compensated changes. A full analysis of policy would need to relate the
parameter shifts explicitly to policy instruments such as tax rates, and integrate the results of this
paper with already existing results in public economics; this is, however, beyond the scope of one
paper (some cases are considered in Apps and Rees (1988)). While it is not claimed that the range
of models and policies considered is comprehensive (the range of possible non-cooperative models
is infinite), it does provide a reasonable sense of the main competing alternatives.
Although many of the arguments are of universal interest, the structure of the non-cooperative
models, and the structure of the non-cooperative model, is motivated by the case of sub-Saharan
Africa. Many authors (for example (Gladwin (1991) Darity (1995), Whitehead (1991)) have
argued that structural adjustment, which typically increases the returns to cash crops, is likely to
be gender-biased because men are more involved in cash-cropping than women. What has not
been widely appreciated is that this claim is highly sensitive to the structure of the model; the
observations than men are better off than women and that they control most of the income from
cash cropping do not imply that women lose from increases in the absolute or even relative returns
to it. The results in this paper suggest that increases in the relative returns to cash cropping are
likely to hurt women in some models; however, it is important to stress that the claim that women
lose from absolute increases in cash cropping is much stronger and is not explored here.
The main results are as follows. Reductions in the price of commodities which form a higher share
of women's than of men's spending benefit women; however, in some models the relevant variable
is the share of total expenditure whereas in others it is the share of marginal expenditure.
Increases in relative female wages can either hurt women or benefit them, depending on the
model. Increases in the relative returns to domestic output, and transfers of assets to women, are
much more likely to benefit women than to hurt them, although they may be gender-neutral. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the constraints on the household, the
competing models of household allocation, and the representation of the policymaker's problem.
Sections 3 to 6 use this framework to consider specific parameter changes which can be caused
by economic policy. In each of these sections, I discuss the findings of each model and then
discuss how robust the parameter change is. Section 7 concludes, raising various issues not
captured in the formal models. 
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The constraints on the household are common to all the models, but behaviour differs among
them.
2.1 The constraints on the household
There are two individuals, a husband and wife, indexed m and f. They consume vectors of goods
x  and x at a price vector p, and scalars of domestically produced goods z  and z which are m f m f
produced by domestic labour h , and h through a production function f(h , h). The household m f m f
also produces a cash crop using its own labour l , l through a production function g(l , g) and m f m f
sells the output for the exogenously given price p . Both production functions are assumed to c
have diminishing returns and to be increasing in both parties' labour; it is also assumed that the
cross-partial derivatives are negative, so that male and female labour are (not necessarily perfect)
substitutes. Each individual's time endowment is normalised to unity and distributed across h, l,
L, which is leisure, and labour supplied to the market for the exogenously set wage w  or w; thus m f
wages received are w (1-h -l -L ) and w(1-h-l-L). Finally, individual unearned income is given m m m m f f f f
by y  and y. m f
Total consumption must satisfy the following equations:
(2)
Finally, individual welfare is measured by a self-interested utility function, assumed cardinal and
interpersonally comparable, given by
(3)
This utility function is used to measure welfare in all models and will play a role in predicting
individual behaviour in the non-cooperative model. Wage labour is implicitly included through the
requirement that all forms of time use sum to 1 for each person. The first derivatives of utility with
regard to l, h and L represent the marginal utility from substituting these forms of time use for
wage labour; these first derivatives are ambiguous in sign for h and l but must be positive for L.
The matrix of second-derivatives is assumed negative definite. It is assumed that *u/*z and i i
*u/*L tend to infinity as z and L respectively tend to zero. Defining individual cash expenditure i i i i
C as p'x, indirect utility v is defined as i i i
(4)H ’ "mum % "fuf, "m > "f
N ’ (um&um)(uf & uf)
Y ’ ’i’m,fwi(1&li&hi&Li) % pcg(lm,lf) % p
(f(hi,li)%wiLi%(wi
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and is increasing and concave in income. It will be assumed that *v/*C tends to infinity as C i i i
tends to zero.
These functions represent the welfare of men and women used by the policymaker. The prediction
of individual behaviour uses them indirectly. In the unitary and bargaining models, the household
maximises a function of the individual utility functions. In the non-cooperative case, men and
women are imperfect altruists who maximise weighted sums of their own and their spouse's self-
interested utility. 
2.2 Pareto-efficient models of the household
The econometric implications of internal Pareto-efficiency have been studied by Chiappori (1992).
Chiappori's representation encompasses models with very different policy implications; for the
purposes of this paper, it is necessary to distinguish them. Hence I analyse both unitary and Nash-
bargaining models. In both, the household jointly takes labour supply and consumption decisions
to maximise functions of individual self-interested utility. In the unitary model, the household
maximises H as defined by
(5)
The constancy of "  and " distinguishes the unitary model from other Pareto-efficient models. m f
This model might represent the outcome of the decisions taken by a single household member,
a 'patriarch', or a negotiated solution to internal family discussions. The paper's results continue
to hold if "  = " or  "  < ", but policy implications change since women are no longer relatively m f m f
disadvantaged. 
In the bargaining model the household maximises N defined by
(6)
where u % represents the outside option taken in the event that bargaining fails. Outside options
have been variously interpreted as divorce, return to the parental home, and reversion to a non-
cooperative equilibrium defined by social norms (see McElroy (1997) and Lundberg and Pollak
(1993)). In this paper, outside options are not explicitly modelled, but the discussion will assume
that they represent the welfare of one-person male and female households after divorce. McElroy
(1997) offers an interesting general justification of the importance of outside options based on the
functioning of marriage markets.
Comparative statics for these two models are derived using a dual approach as follows. Define
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where p* is the shadow price of non-traded output and w*  and w*  are the shadow wage of il ih
labour on cash crops and household goods respectively. Time is thus valued at the market wage,
and activities which are less (more) productive than wage labour are treated as positive (negative)
expenditure valued at the difference between the returns to them and the market wage. Because
there is no joint consumption or externality, all consumption is clearly attached to individuals and
therefore individual shadow expenditure E can be defined i
(8)
All Pareto-efficient allocations can be represented by a decision process whereby individuals are
allocated a total shadow expenditure E and then choose consumption and time use to maximise i
utility subject to their personal expenditure constraint (Chiappori 1997). The constraints on the
household require that shadow prices adjust to induce labour supplies and consumption which
satisfy equations (1) and (2); this will imply that 
(9)
Equivalently, the household chooses consumption and time use for both individuals to minimise
total shadow expenditure E E, given p , w* and p*, subject to a given level of the maximand H i i c
or N. Individual shadow expenditures, similarly, are minimised subject to a utility constraint,
implying an expenditure function E for any given utility level u' i i
(10)
The solutions to the household's problem imply first-order conditions, where subscripts denote
partial derivatives:
(11)
for the unitary model and
(12)
I now derive the comparative statics of compensated parameter changes. A compensated change











































































and for the bargaining case as one which satisfies
(14)
A compensated price change in the unitary model leaves the maximand H unchanged. In the Nash-
bargaining case, a compensated change is defined as one which moves the utility of the two
parties in opposite directions and would leave the maximand N unchanged if it did not also alter
the outside options. (Defining compensation by constancy in N would allow 'compensated' price
changes to hurt, or benefit, both parties; hence the definition used here). 
Totally differentiating (11) and (12), substituting (13) and (14) into the result, and exploiting the
equality of the second derivatives of cost functions with the derivatives of Hicksian demands, we
get for the unitary case, 
(15)
and for the bargaining case 
(16)
These apparently complex equations have a simple structure. The first term on the right-hand side
of each equation is positive, from the convexity of the expenditure function in utility. Hence the
sign of (15)  depends on the sign of the product of changes in (market and shadow) prices and
wages with the derivatives of the respective Hicksian demands with respect to utility. (16) has the
same structure, but movements in the outside options also feature. (16) allows us to disaggregate
the impact of any parameter change into three components: the direct impact of the change itself,w
(
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the effects of resulting changes in shadow prices, and the effects of resulting movements in the
utility derived from outside options. 
Finally, Pareto-efficiency implies the equality of shadow wages with shadow marginal products




The a priori appeal of Pareto-efficiency is balanced by empirical evidence against it. Jones (1986)
found that women in Cameroon under-allocated labour to cash crops because their husbands
controlled income from them. Udry (1996) found that marginal products differed across men's and
women's plots; the incentive to work on one's own plot was important. In East Africa, qualitative
evidence shows that husbands often control most of the income generated from cash crops and
that women resent working on them as a result (Nalwanga-Ssebina and Natakunda (1988), von
Bulow and Sorensen (1993), Harmsworth (1991)). 
This section develops a non-cooperative alternative. There cannot be a single archetypical non-
cooperative model, because the allocation of decisions, the order of moves, and the modelling of
non-cooperative equilibrium can all vary between models. Non-cooperative models have been
developed by Ulph (1988), Darity (1996), Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) and Carter and Katz
(1997)), though most of these authors do not explicitly derive the comparative statics of individual
utility. Typical features of these models include the use of noncooperative Nash solutions in
labour allocation and/or consumption and the importance of transfers. The model presented in this
paper starts from some stylised facts about African rural households. First, men control most of
the income from cash crops. Secondly, women have responsibility for some decisions involving
food crops (though there is sometimes strong male involvement here too; in some parts of
Uganda, a wife will consult her husband before picking bananas for the evening meal). Thirdly,
women do some of the work on cash crops. Fourthly, this allocation of decisions creates an
incentive problem. 
The two agents are imperfect altruists. The husband's objective function is
(19)
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In the first stage, both parties choose labour supply to all three activities. They take these
decisions independently, generating a noncooperative Nash equilibrium in amounts of time
supplied to each activity. At the second stage, the husband collects his wage income and the
income from cash crops; the wife collects her own wage earnings and also controls domestic
output. Each party may then make a transfer to their spouse. In the final stage, individuals choose
their expenditure, constrained by the post-transfer endowments of domestic and purchased goods.
The first-stage labour supply decisions correctly anticipate the effect on the subsequent allocation
of goods. 
In this model, a compensated parameter change will be defined as one which produces no change
in the sum of utility, u  + u. As with the Pareto-efficient models, this implies that if a m f
compensated change benefits one party it will hurt the other. In the absence of a household
maximand, the dual approach fails to simplify the problem, and comparative statics are therefore
analysed using the primal, starting with the decomposition
(21)
The two second-stage decisions, which allocate purchased and domestic goods, follow from the





The restrictions on the utility function imply that there must be transfers of domestic output from
women to men; otherwise men's marginal utility from domestic output would be infinite. If women
are earning wages, the same argument does not apply to transfers of purchased goods; hence (22),
but not (23), can hold with inequality. This give two regimes, with and without cash transfers,
whose comparative static properties differ. 
If there are cash transfers, totally differentiating (22) and (23) and substituting in the total
derivatives of (1) and (2), we get 
(24)
and dzf ’ ((muzzm % (fuzzf)&1[(m(uzzmdf(hm,hf) % uCzmdCm % ulzm
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(25)
These resemble (15-16) but apply to any set of parameter changes, whether compensated or not.
Both agents take labour supply decisions in correct anticipation of their effect of increasing
income on personal welfare, dv/dC and du/df(h , h). These can be found from (22-5), setting i i m f
dp=dl=dh=dL=0 and using the chain rule
(26)








with complementary slackness in each case. Both parties always consume some leisure. It will be











commitment of time to a particular activity is typically decreasing in the other person's
commitment of time to the same activity. 
2.4 The policymaker
The policymaker wants to transfer welfare, measured by self-interested-preferences (3), from men
to women. Of course, a full treatment of optimal policy would derive this objective from a social
welfare function, but the purpose of this paper is to isolate the effects on the relative welfare of
the sexes rather than to attempt the much larger exercise of characterising optimal policy. The
tools directly available to policymakers are not modelled. However, changes in prices and wages
can be influenced by taxes, subsidies, and employment generation schemes (see Ravallion and Datt
(1995)): the distribution of assets can be influenced by direct transfers, incentives for female
education, or changes to land rights: and the relative returns to cash cropping and domestic
production can be influenced by marketing and exchange rate policy, and improvements in water
supply, energy sources, and cooking technology. Only compensated parameter changes are
modelled. The question addressed is whether a given change will make women better off, and men
worse off, in each model. A compensated parameter change is defined as robust if it benefits
women in all cases, or weakly robust if it does not hurt women in any case. 
3 Changes in relative consumer prices
The gender implications of changes in consumer prices have been relatively little discussed in the
literature (though see Apps and Rees (1988)). The change considered here is a compensated
movement in different elements of the vector p.
Unitary and bargaining models
 
(15) and (16) provide the basis for analysis, setting dw  = dw =0. For a compensated price m f
change, some elements of the vector p will rise while others fall. 
The direct effects are found by setting   dw  = dw =dp* = dw* =dw* =0 in (15) and (16). The m f il ih
sign of (15) and (16) now depends on the sum, over commodities, of the product of the
movement in the price of the good with the derivative of demand for the good with respect to
utility. Substituting the first-order conditions (13) and (14) into the relevant terms from (15) and
(16), we get the conditions for a fall in a particular commodity price p to benefit women:  j
(33)
which can be expressed
(34)Eumdum/dpj > Eufduf/dpj
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This is the slope of the Engel curve in full expenditure. So the policymakers should reduce the
relative prices of goods for which women have a steeper full Engel curve than men; this reduces
the marginal cost of conferring utility on them and therefore increases the incentive for the
household to do so. 
The effect of price changes on outside options, which operates only in the bargaining model,
favours women if 
(35)
Applying Roy's identity to the expenditure of divorced people, it follows that the outside option
effects benefit women if the relative prices of commodities which are a larger share of the
expenditure of divorced men than divorced women fall. 
Finally, if shadow prices and shadow wages move, there are effects on labour supply which can
influence welfare. These effects favour women if there are reductions in the relative prices of
goods which complement forms of time use which are increasing in women's welfare at the
margin. For instance, the consumption of bread, rather than rice, in Sri Lanka has been shown to
substitute for cooking time (Senauer et al. (1986)); a fall in the price of bread would therefore
typically reduce w*   (by reducing du/dz and hence p*; an alternative formalisation, which would hf i i
give the same result in a more complex way, would treat bread and rice as purchased inputs into
household production). If women find preparation of a given kind of food particularly tedious or
unpleasant, then increases in its price or reductions in the price of a substitute will benefit them.
In principle these effects could be gender-neutral, but in most cultures women do most of the
cooking. Whether women like cooking can to some extent be estimated econometrically, but it
may be simpler and more effective to ask them.
The non-cooperative models
The decomposition in (21) distinguishes consumption and labour supply effects. If there are
transfers, the husband's allocation of consumer goods has exactly the same form as the unitary
case and can be found from (22); the term u  is the primal equivalent of the term in E  in the Cpji upji
dual problem. Hence the results from the unitary case hold. 
The effects of consumer good prices on time use are somewhat harder to analyse. If prices move
so as to induce an increased allocation of consumer goods to women, this will have both income
and substitution effects on labour supply to cash-raising activities; it will reduce *v/*C but will f f
increase dC/dC, so that (from (26)) the overall change in dv/dC, and the direction of the induced f f
shift in time use, is ambiguous. The same applies to dv /dC. Hence it is unclear whether women m
will move into or out of the generation of cash income. Moreover, even if the direction of the
labour supply effect were known, its welfare effects would also be ambiguous. If women increase
their marketed labour supply at the expense of leisure, then they lose from the labour supply








Since the labour supply effects are ambiguous and the consumption allocation effects are the same
as those in the unitary case, a reasonable presumption is that the results from the unitary case on
the benefits of reducing the prices of goods which women consume at the margin will hold. 
For the non-cooperative case without transfers, things are simpler. A relative price change will
directly benefit women and hurt men if 
(36)
This will be the case if the prices of commodities which form a larger share of female than male
consumption fall while others rise. Labour supply effects can arise in this model as well, although
one possible outcome of the model is that no activity is performed by both parties, in which case
the Nash-equilibrium effects considered above do not come into play.
Robustness
Provided the direct price effects are not swamped by indirect labour supply effects of ambiguous
sign, a reduction in the prices of 'female' commodities will benefit women in all models. However,
the exact meaning of 'female' commodities varies, referring sometimes to average and sometimes
to marginal shares of expenditure. Fortunately, commodities with higher average shares of
average female than male expenditure will also usually have higher marginal shares. There is
evidence in Uganda that clothing may have these properties (Appleton and Mackinnon 1995);
alcohol certainly often has the opposite properties. Outside-option effects, if they operate, tend
to reinforce the direct price effects. Finally, reductions in the relative prices of foods which are
arduous to prepare usually benefit women.
4 Changes in relative wages
Differentials between male and female wages are often taken as evidence of gender discrimination,
though in some countries they may reflect differences in productivity (see Quisumbing (1996)).
It may therefore be surprising that the effect on relative female welfare of a rise in relative female
wages is ambiguous; this is a very non-robust recommendation which may hurt women. 
4.1 Pareto-efficient models
For the unitary model, (15) is again the critical equation. The direct effects are found by inserting
changes in w and w of opposing sign while making no change in shadow prices or the outside f f
option. It can be seen immediately that women lose from the direct effects of this change in








which will be true if, for instance, wage labour is the least preferred activity. The reason is that
the change in wages increases the marginal opportunity cost of women's preferred activities. The
effect is more powerful the more unpleasant wage labour is; so increasing women's wages for the
worst jobs may, paradoxically, have the worst intra-household distributional effects. Since time
use is the main dimension of relative female deprivation in many societies, the effect is worth
taking seriously. 
If leisure complements consumption, this tends to increase the magnitude of d(1-l-h-L) and f f f
therefore increases the size of the reduction in female welfare; intuitively, women will now lose
in consumption as well as leisure. The opposite applies if consumption substitutes for leisure.
Movements in shadow wages will in general reinforce the direct effect, because the shadow wages
for other female activities will rise, leading to an increased burden of time on women and a
reduction in their leisure. The direction and effects of the induced movement in the shadow price
of domestic output are ambiguous; women's greater involvement in domestic production suggests
that it is likely to rise. If women are also more intensive consumers of domestic output, this will
hurt them further. 
In the bargaining model, these negative effects are likely to be counteracted by a positive effect
through the increase in the value of women's outside options. Haddad and Kanbur (1992) discuss
this effect, noting that it has a 'long reach' in that it affects even households where women supply
no labour to the market, so long as they would do so if they became divorced. The overall impact
on female welfare depends on the relative strength of the opportunity-cost and the outside-option





Consider first the case with cash transfers. Since the wage increase is compensated, there is no
general reason to expect consumption to move in either direction; hence the substitution effect
on labour supply is likely to dominate the income effect, leading to increases in female and
reductions in male labour supply. From (27-32), it can be seen that the reaction curves shift in
opposite directions, and movements along the new reaction curves reinforce the effect (as
women's labour supply increases, men react by reducing their labour supply). The welfare
implications are therefore as in the unitary model; if wage labour is the least preferred activity,
then women will lose. As with the unitary case, effects on the pattern of consumption may affect
relative welfare but will not typically dominate the labour supply effects.
In the noncooperative case without cash transfers, however, it is trivial that women gain from the
increase in relative female wages, because their incomes increase.14
Regime-switching can complicate these results; a large enough increase in relative wages can
benefit women even in the case with transfers, because it shifts the regime of the model. However,
if the increase is large enough, women may start transferring cash income to men, in which case
they begin to lose from any further increase in their relative wages. 
4.3 Robustness
The above discussion shows that the distributional benefits of increases in relative female wages
are far from robust. Even if attention were restricted to the Pareto-efficient models, or to the non-
cooperative models, it would be uncertain whether increases in relative female wages benefit
women. These results arise from the time burden on women; hence the consensus that increases
in the female share of income are good news for children (see Hoddinott and Haddad 1995) do
not remove the possibility that women themselves may lose from them. 
Two caveats apply. First, if wage labour is an activity preferred by women, then women will
benefit both from the substitution and the outside-option effects. The ambiguity applies most
strongly to wages for disagreeable work. Secondly, if women prefer to work at the margin but
are prevented by male coercion, as Chen (1995) reports for higher-caste women in rural India,
then the results would not hold.
5 Increases in returns to cash crops and domestic production
In Africa, structural adjustment usually aims to increase the opportunities for households to earn
their income by growing cash crops. This objective has been widely criticised on the grounds that
it increases the burden on women's time while the control of income is passed to men. It is often
suggested that women will prefer an increase in productivity in the production of non-marketed
goods (Whitehead (1991)). 
Here I consider a reduction in the price of cash crops compensated by a rise in the productivity
of domestic labour; if the arguments of the critics of adjustment are right, this will benefit women.
The cause of the increase in domestic productivity is not specified, but policy instruments include
improved access to clean water and the promotion of improved energy sources and energy-
efficient stoves. Malmberg-Calvo (1994) found that for rural African households the burden of
time taken up by carrying water and firewood for a household were equivalent to a full-time job;
so reductions in this burden are potentially important. 
5.1 Pareto-efficient models
A reduction in returns to cash cropping is represented by a fall in p  and a consequent fall in w c lm
*
and w . The reduced opportunity cost of time will typically reduce p  and w  for both sexes as lf h
* * *
well. The outside option may also be reduced for both sexes.
The increase in productivity in domestic goods causes an excess supply of the good in the short
run, driving down p . The shadow wage of labour in domestic production, w  and w  may either
* * *
hm hf
rise or fall, as can be seen from (18); an additive rise in f(h , h) causes a fall in w  and w , m f hm hf
* *
because p* falls and *f/*h does not change. A multiplicative increase, which increases the i













way; the more inelastic demand for the output is, the more likely that the wage will fall. The
outside option may also be increased for both sexes.
The net effects of the compensated package change are therefore to reduce w , w  and p . The lm lf z
* * *
effect on w , w  and u % is theoretically ambiguous for both sexes.  hm hf*
*
We now apply these parameter changes to (15) and (16). First, the policy increases the shadow
price of domestic goods relative to purchased goods; the relative welfare effects depend on the
relative slopes of men's and women's full Engel curves for the two kinds of commodity, and are
ambiguous. Secondly, the increase in shadow wages applies to both parties. The increase in the
shadow wage in cash-crop production will depend on the relative values of dl /du  and dl/du, m m f f
which depend both on the relative roles of both sexes in crop output and in the disutility attached
to different tasks. Neither the effects on shadow prices nor the effects on shadow wages therefore
gives any clear guide to the gender effects of adjustment in the unitary model.
The analysis for the bargaining model is identical to that for the unitary model except for the
inclusion of outside-option effects. Empirically, there is some evidence that female-headed
households are much less involved in cash crop production than male-headed households.
Appleton et al. (1997), drawing on Collier (1989), discuss the reasons for this. Whatever the
cause, it is clear that given the observed pattern of behaviour, an increase in returns to domestic
production relative to cash crops will improve women's bargaining position relative to men's. This
provides a reason to expect women to benefit from the policy.
5.2 Non-cooperative models
The non-cooperative model offers a structure specifically designed to address this problem. As
above, the policy change as above is represented by a reduction in p  and a compensating increase
c
in the function f(h , h). Again, the decomposition in (21) is useful. The consumption effects are m f
found from (24) and (25), setting dC < 0, df(h , h) > 0 and dp = 0. There is no general answer, m f
but one special case is illuminating. Assume that both parties have the same utility function which
is additively separable in time use, purchased goods and domestic goods. Now the cross-partial
derivatives are zero. Substituting the first-order condition (22-23) into the simplified form of (24-
5), and dividing the female expressions by the male, we get
(39)
No , if the utility function is quadratic in consumption, then the utility benefits from marginal
increases in income in both sectors are equally split across genders. However, if the third
derivative of utility is positive, as Deaton (1991) has shown to be a reasonable condition for
decisions involving risk, then v  will be smaller in absolute terms than v  (because men CCm CCf
consume more purchased goods than women) but for domestic goods (where women control the
allocation and as a result consume more), u  will be smaller in absolute terms than u . As a zzf zzm
result, women will benefit more than men from increases in domestic productivity, and will lose










the natural view that women benefit from a transfer of income to the sector where they control
it turns out to depend on a reasonable assumption about the third derivative of utility.
As with the unitary model, the effects in income are complicated by effects on time use whose
welfare implications are uncertain. 
Finally, in the non-cooperative model without transfers it is obvious that men gain and women
lose from the change, since men are assumed to get all the income from cash cropping: the first
part of (39) is replaced by 
(40)
5.3 Robustness
In the unitary model, there is very little presumption that increasing the relative returns to
domestic production benefits either sex. In the non-cooperative model with transfers, there is
some presumption that women will benefit, depending on a realistic assumption about the third
derivative of the utility function. In the bargaining model (making realistic assumptions about the
outside options facing men and women) and in the non-cooperative model without transfers, the
presumption that women will benefit is strong. We can therefore describe the policy of improving
the relative returns to domestic rather than cash crop production as weakly robust; it is good for
women in some cases and not very likely to be bad for them in any of the models.
These results do not show that women lose in absolute terms from adjustment, because they have
been established only for compensated changes. Adjustment in Africa has produced non-
compensated increases in the incomes of cash-cropping households, and although it is possible
women might not benefit, further empirical and theoretical work is needed to establish how likely
this is. Moreover, women can gain from increases in wages in cash-cropping sectors, which are
sometimes important employers of poor women (Sender and Smith (1990)). A full empirical study
needs to examine both female consumption and time use and to disaggregate the effects of
different policies and other events, explicitly modelling the counterfactual; no such study currently
exists. What the results do suggest is that the distribution of the benefits of trade liberalisation is
likely to be gender-biased in that men benefit more than women, and that actions to promote the
productivity of domestic work can help to correct this bias. 
Some insight into the labour-supply effects can be derived from Malmberg-Calvo (1994).
Malmberg-Calvo surveys studies of water supply which suggest that although water consumption
increases when water supplies are brought nearer to the household, the time spent collecting water
usually falls, suggesting that demand is inelastic and that w * falls. Since women carry most of f
h
the water, their time burden is directly reduced. However, this may not increase their welfare,
because their time my be diverted into more disagreeable activities. For instance, women in part
of Tanzania expected their time burden to be reduced by improved water supply, but instead
found themselves performing different kinds of work (it is not stated whether they were glad
about the change). In a study in Lesotho, on the other hand, most of the released time was spent
resting and on social activities. Finally, the evidence on the disutilty attached to fetching water17
also varies; in one study 22% of women reported that fetching water was their favourite activity,
but in other cases it was found unpleasant. These studies show that local knowledge is important
but also that even those directly affected by public actions may not accurately predict their own
households' responses. 
6 Transfers of assets
Cash incomes, but not land or education, are explicitly included in the models given above;
however, something can be said about all three cases. 
Cash transfers from men to women are modelled by reducing y  and increasing y (though in a m f
dynamic case it would be important to distinguish between one-off gifts and recurrent incomes).
They have no effect on outcomes in the unitary model. They will benefit women if they improve
the outside option for them in the bargaining model; this will follow so long as they are paid to
divorced women as well as married women. They have no effect on the non-cooperative model
with transfers, because the man's allocation of purchased goods will adjust to keep the first-order
conditions observed, unless they cause a regime shift. In the model without husband-wife cash
transfers, however, they improve women's relative welfare. Cash redistribution is thus weakly
robust; it never hurts women and helps them in some models. This finding is familiar; several
authors, including Ulph (1988) and Lundberg and Pollak (1993), have explored whether child
benefit should be paid directly to women. 
Transfers of land from men to women probably have the same effect as cash transfers, though in
the non-cooperative model they may have more complex effects on production. To assess these
effects it would be necessary to model the productive role of land explicitly. The effect of land on
the outside option in the bargaining model is of great practical importance; law on the rights of
couples at marital separation is a very important gender issue in much of Africa. In one African
country, a proposal to strengthen these rights was physically shouted down in the Constituent
Assembly. Related measures not formally modelled here include requiring the wife's consent to
sale of land, and strengthening the inheritance rights of women in the event of their husband's
death.
Finally, consider an increase in female education at the expense of male. Education is assumed to
increase returns to the individual's time in all activities. This is represented by upward shifts in the
wage, the production functions and the outside options and (especially if education makes leisure
more rewarding) the utility function. There are then three effects. First, the increase in utility
directly benefits women in all models. Secondly, the change in production functions and wages
will benefit women in the non-cooperative models without transfers, but has ambiguous effects
in the other three models; only if education disproportionately increases the returns to agreeable
forms of time use do these effects benefit women in all models. Finally, in the bargaining model,
the change strengthens women's outside options. While the results are not conclusive, they are
much more positive than those for relative increases in female wages, because education enhances
leisure as well as work.18
7 Conclusions 
Table 1 summarises the findings of the above analysis. 
Table 1: The effects of compensated policy changes
Policy Household model
Unitary Bargaining Non-coop. Noncoop.
with transfers without
transfers
Reduce relative F F F F
price of female 
consumer goods
Small increase  ?M ? ?M F
in relative
female wages
Large increase ?M ? F F
in relative 
female wages
Increase relative ? ?F ?F F
returns to domestic
rather than cash crop
output
Cash transfers to women  N F N F
Land transfers to women N F ?N F
Female rather than  ? ?F ? F
male education
F- almost certainly pro-female
?F - probably pro-female
? - ambiguous
?M -probably pro-male
M- almost certainly pro-male
N - no effect19
While female-headed households have not been analysed, it is clear that they would benefit from
most of these policies, with the possible exception of the shift from returns to cash crops to
domestic output.
The static and utilitarian approach adopted here has some limitations. This paper has tried to meet
the arguments of Sen (1987) by restricting the policymaker's concerns to women's self-interested
preferences, not their altruism. However, some concerns remain. Women's deprivation might
reduce their assertiveness in bargaining or their marginal utility of consumption, affecting all the
models' solutions (Sen (1987)): contributions as well as outcomes may matter (Tobin (1980),
Margolis (1982), Mackinnon (1987), Sen (1987)): autonomy may matter as well as expenditure
and time use (Jackson (1996)); and women's labour supply may be constrained by male
preferences (Chen (1995)). Finally, while the extension to several adults is trivial, the extension
to children whose interests may be defended by the mother (Haddad and Hoddinott (1994),
Hoddinott and Haddad (1996)) raises substantial issues. In particular, as noted above, the
evidence that increases in female incomes improve children's welfare does not necessarily imply
they increase women's welfare. 
Making the models dynamic would raise two issues. First, income gains may generate savings and
hence higher incomes in later years, while leisure gains may not. Secondly, time-consistency
problems afflict Pareto-efficient models if solutions can be renegotiated. For instance, a husband
might resist his wife's acquisition of education which would increase her future bargaining power;
in this case dynamic Pareto-efficiency will not be achieved. 
Four areas for further investigation are the extension of the results to uncompensated price
changes: the determinants of the division of labour in non-cooperative models (for instance, van
Braun and Webb (1989) found that commercialisation of rice production changed control of the
income from the crop from female- to male-dominated), and the explanation of the empirically
supported Pareto-inefficiency characteristic of these models: explicit modelling of the interests
of children: and the nutritional implications of policy changes. If food is not marketed, all the
models, even without female disadvantage, are consistent with the evidence (discussed in Kennedy
(1994)) that rises in income often fail to improve nutrition, but the issue deserves more theoretical
work.
The theory developed here encourages three approaches to addressing gender inequality in
developing countries: reductions in the relative prices of female consumer goods: improvements
in domestic productivity, such as the development of better water supply, energy sources and
cooking technology: and improvements in women's education and legal rights to own assets.
However, the theory remains complex and fluid, so that the beneficial effects of such policies
cannot be taken for granted. Theory can suggest how policy may help women, and issue some
important caveats; but only careful empirical investigation can confirm whether the suggested
policies are in fact practicable and effective.20
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